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Abstract
Given the increasing diversity of religious beliefs and outlooks in the United States, John 
Dewey’s proposals regarding “a common faith” can help educators provide the tools for 
their students to think critically about these and other issues related to the changing 
religious landscape. Particular attention is given to three groups of students: those who 
are adherents of dogmatic or exclusivist religious communities; those who share the 
belief that no legitimate value judgments about religious faith are possible; and those 
religiously unaffiliated students who feel excluded from the possibility of religious faith.
Let me begin by thanking the society’s officers: President Kathleen Knight- 
Abowitz, President-Elect Len Waks, immediate past President Deron Boyles, Secre-
tary-Treasurer Kyle Greenwalt, membership and development officer Mark Kissling, 
and of course student liaison Matt Ryg and webmaster Zane Wubbena. I know 
that their many efforts on behalf of this society are much appreciated by all of us. 
In 1955, when Will Herberg published his influential book, Protestant– 
Catholic–Jew, it could be said with some confidence that an essay in American 
religious sociology could claim exhaustive coverage by restricting its analysis to 
those three faiths. Scarcely a decade later, however, that formula would be obsoles-
cent. The 1960s saw the rise of what José Casanova, glossing Thomas Luckmann, 
termed religions “of self expression and self-realization along with the triumph of 
the therapeutic.”1 Thirty years further on, the 1990s gave us “pastoral care of the 
soul as big business” and the rejection of organized religion in favor of ecumenical 
spirituality. Americans were offered a new category, “spiritual but not religious.”2 
Since that time, the religious profile of America, never simple, has become even 
more complex. The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life reports that “more than 
one quarter (28%) of American adults have left the faith in which they were raised in 
favor of another religion—or no religion at all. If change in affiliation from one type 
of Protestantism to another is included, roughly 44% of adults have either switched 
religious affiliation, moved from being unaffiliated with any religion to being affili-
ated with a particular faith, or dropped any connection to a specific religious tradition 
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altogether.”3 In its 2012 survey, Pew reports that some 19% of Americans claimed no reli-
gious affiliation. Among those who describe themselves as politically liberal, that figure 
is in the neighborhood of 40% and trending upward. Further, “among Americans ages 
18–29, one in three say they are not currently affiliated with any particular religion.”4 
This complex picture, coupled with the fact that our students may also bring 
their religious backgrounds as Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, or Wiccans to our 
classrooms, provokes a consideration of my topic: What we can teach when we 
teach (about) religion.
Given the dogmatism and exclusivity of some contemporary forms of religious 
belief, for example, how can the religious experiences of our students be liberated so 
that they can travel along broader avenues? Given the fact that we are now living in 
what is increasingly becoming a culturally rich and highly pluralistic society, how can 
we help our students assess whether some forms of religious belief are better adapted 
than others to these new circumstances? Is it possible for us and our fellow Ameri-
cans, despite our many individual and cultural differences, to share a common faith? 
If so, what form would that type of faith take? And how can we help our students 
develop the tools they will need to think critically about these questions, which are 
all the more difficult because they are both intensely personal and profoundly public?
More specifically, I want to focus on these questions with three very differ-
ent groups of students in mind. Although these groups are not exhaustive, they 
do tend to cut across the religious (and nonreligious) affiliations that are reflected 
in the Pew studies. 
The first group includes those who share the beliefs of dogmatic and exclusivist 
religious communities. The second group includes those who share the belief that now 
there is only deferral and difference—that commonality among humans is ephemeral 
and that legitimate value judgments about religious faith and practice are elusive. The 
third group includes those who feel that because they are not affiliated with any reli-
gious community, they are therefore excluded from the possibility of religious faith.
It is important to note that the issue I am addressing is closely related to, but 
significantly distinct from, controversies regarding how the Bible can be taught in 
public schools. Nevertheless, in their excellent empirical study of that issue, For 
the Civic Good: The Liberal Case for Teaching Religion in the Public Schools, Walter 
Feinberg and Richard A. Layton have provided a set of tools that can be useful for 
our present purposes. First, they are careful to distinguish constitutional legitimacy 
from educational legitimacy. As to the former, constitutional legitimacy, they cite 
the influential Supreme Court decision in the case of Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) 
regarding the constitutionality of government legislation in the sphere of religion. 
Chief Justice Warren Burger delineated the following three-part test: “First, the 
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary 
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute 
must not foster ‘excessive entanglement with religion.’”5 
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If constitutional legitimacy tends to be restrictive with respect to govern-
ment, then educational legitimacy can be understood as expansive with respect 
to the teacher. Feinberg and Layton offer three criteria of educational legitimacy: 
first, there should be respect based on the obligation of teachers to students; second, 
there should be inclusiveness based on the obligation of teachers to a democratic 
public; and third, there should be academic integrity based on the obligation of 
teachers to their subject matter. These are important considerations that provide a 
background for thinking about what we can teach when we teach (about) religion. 
More specific to my topic, however, I believe that one of the ways we can begin 
to address the needs of students of the three types I have mentioned is by helping 
them to understand that evolution, including the evolution of religious beliefs and 
institutions, is a reality that they do well to take into account if they are to under-
stand their milieu historically, culturally, and socially.
Of course, I need not remind this audience that the question of how (or indeed 
whether) evolution is to be taught in public schools, colleges, and universities is itself 
often a subject of contention. In a recent interview, for example, the Governor of Wis-
consin, Scott Walker, appeared to be confused about that very issue.6 But since that 
matter is outside the scope of what I want to discuss today, I hope you will simply allow 
me to stipulate that as teachers we have an obligation to educate our students about 
evolution as both fact and theory whenever the topic is appropriate to our subject mat-
ter. In their outstanding essay “Addressing Controversies in Science and Education: A 
Pragmatic Approach to Evolution Education,” David Hildebrand, Kimberly Bilica, and 
John Capps provide an excellent discussion of this issue that is rich in themes that will 
be familiar to members of this society, so I am pleased to recommend their study to you.
So as we think about what we can teach when we teach (about) religion, it is 
important that we emphasize the fact that evolution itself evolves, that is, that what 
we understand by the evolution of beliefs and practices itself undergoes continual 
change. Education about religion means that we must encourage our students to 
reject absolutist facades that deny progress through time, to reject the urge to take 
refuge in vague varieties of relativism, and also to reject the possibility that religious 
experience is something that is no longer possible for educated men and women. 
Honesty demands that we not blink at the fact that if our students are to 
understand their place in our rapidly changing world, then it is inevitable that 
some systems of religious belief be understood as more evolved than others. By 
this I mean that some are better adapted than others to the demands of life in our 
rapidly changing environment.
There are many productive ways to address this issue. One way is to start from his-
torical accounts and taxonomies. Robert Bellah, for example, has proposed that we think 
historically; he offers five stages: (1) the primitive-aboriginal stage, (2) the archaic stage 
of ancient Greece, (3) the historical stage of Roman Catholicism, (4) the early modern 
stage of Protestantism, and (5) the modern stage of meditative and integrative religions.7 
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Even given its apparent Eurocentric bias, this schema can serve as a tool for 
opening up fruitful classroom discussions, since it opens the door in stage five 
for consideration of non-Western religions such as Buddhism. Other taxonomies 
track progress from less to more evolved forms in terms of ontological commit-
ments, organizational structures, commitment to ecumenical values, and so on. 
The use of these historical accounts and taxonomies in no way commits us either 
to rigid hierarchies or to a lazy ecumenism that attempts to prop itself up on an 
everything-is-of-equal-value reading of important studies in comparative religion. 
Properly employed, these taxonomies can stimulate rich, productive discussions 
about the relative value of various forms of religious expression within the context 
of the problems and prospects that our students face. 
It is also important to remind our students that just as is often the case with 
biological evolution, newer forms of religious expression and institutions are not by 
that very fact more evolved. In his Pulitzer Prize-winning book, God: A Biography, 
for example, Jack Miles suggests that the idea we find in the Hebrew Bible—especially 
in the books of Genesis and Job—that one can argue with God (and in the case of 
Job, that one can even take the moral high ground) is much more richly evolved than 
some of the aspects of the via negativa of medieval Latin Christianity.8 In terms of my 
wider point, the via negativa constituted a move in theology from process to stasis, 
whereas we know that evolutionary thinking has generally moved in the opposite 
direction, from the stasis of fixed species to models that take process into account.
It would, however, be a mistake to take this point as praise for Judaism over 
Christianity in general. That would not be possible in any event, given the fact that 
the terms Judaism and Christianity designate a wide range of beliefs within their 
respective communities. The point instead would be to initiate a discussion of the 
relative role of human agency and competing concepts of the self within the vari-
ous strands of the two religious traditions.
Good pedagogy dictates that we assess the ways that religious institutions 
accommodate themselves to existing environments, as well as the ways that they seek 
to alter those environments. To claim that we cannot follow these changes through 
time, to claim that we cannot assess their value with respect to certain universaliz-
able values such as tolerance, charity, the promotion of emotional well-being, and 
the growth of individuals and communities, to name a few, would not just be to 
block the way to inquiry: it would strike at the heart of the educational process itself. 
A corollary of this point is that not all existing contexts of religious beliefs and 
practices are created equal. It is undeniable, for example, that we are now experienc-
ing the strong pull of globalizing tendencies. During the coming decades we will 
be living ever more intimately with peoples and institutions that are quite different 
from us and our own. It behooves us and our students to find successful ways of 
doing so. Measured against this larger, global, cultural context, then, it makes no 
sense at all to say that the local cultural context of the caste system that supports 
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the strand of Hinduism that defends abuse of the Dalits (or “untouchables”) is as 
evolved as the democratic cultural context that supports those strands of value-
creating Buddhism that promote equality across lines of class, relative affluence, 
gender, and sexual orientation.
About such matters we must be clear for all of our students, regardless of 
whether they attempt to retreat behind exclusivist religious dogma, or assert with 
the confidence of privilege that no particular vantage point is privileged over any 
other, or think that the possibility of religious faith is closed to them because of 
their lack of institutional affiliation.
In short, it is essential that we prepare the ground for teaching our students 
that some religious expressions are more evolved than others, and by that I mean 
that they are better adapted to the needs of human growth and the opportunities 
of our changing global circumstances.
Now, there will inevitably be members of exclusivist religious groups who 
will object that any educator who follows the path that I have just described, 
who practices what we might call a pragmatist pedagogy, will be guilty of his or her 
own form of proselytizing on behalf of the religion of “secular humanism.” I have 
experienced this argument in my own classrooms. This is how it runs: first premise: 
the critical, pragmatist pedagogy of religion of the type I am describing is a form of 
secular humanism; second premise: secular humanism is religion by another name; 
conclusion: it must therefore follow that to advance a critical pragmatist pedagogy of 
religion is to proselytize for one particular religion at the expense of others. Q. E. D. 
There are several ways to respond to this type of argument. First, there is the 
law. As Feinberg and Layton have pointed out, “the courts have . . . affirmed that 
exposure of students to ideas and values that may be at odds with their own firmly 
held religious beliefs does not constitute disapproval of religion or establishment 
of an alleged religious perspective, such as ‘secular humanism.’”9 
Second, it is easy enough to draw a bright line of sharp distinction between 
proselytizing, on one side, and free and open inquiry, on the other. Generally 
speaking, proselytizing tends to occur in contexts or settings that many regard as 
inappropriate; it tends to be insensitive to cultural and individual backgrounds, 
it begins and ends with positions that are intransigent and dogmatic, and it often 
involves behavior that is aggressive.
The pragmatist pedagogy I am describing takes pains to develop appropri-
ate contexts for discussion. It insists that all parties be sensitive to the cultural and 
individual backgrounds of all discussants. It ensures that discussions remain non-
dogmatic and open to new ideas. It avoids aggressive behavior by carefully manag-
ing discussions in ways that maximize respect. 
Whether we call this type of pedagogy pragmatist or not is of little impor-
tance. It can have various names. It draws on the discourse ethics advanced by 
Juergen Habermas as a basis for democratic life. It resonates with what Richard 
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Bernstein has termed a democratic ethos: in which an engaged pluralism is at once 
agonistic and discursive; in which consensus is neither a presupposition nor a 
goal; in which the most diverse perspectives are welcomed; and in which there is 
a genuine willingness to listen, “to really listen and to hear what the other is say-
ing, to use one’s imagination to understand what may initially strike one as alien 
and even repugnant.”10 
We may wish to call this type of education critical, or humanist, or liberal, 
or democratic, or something similar. I have chosen to call it pragmatist because of 
its intimate connection to the work of John Dewey. But I believe that each of these 
names is appropriate to an educational practice that sets out the terms and con-
ditions for unhindered discussions that include respect, tolerance, civility, open 
minds, generosity of spirit, and fair treatment across lines of gender, class, race, and 
sexual orientation. I submit that attacks on educational practice of this type are not 
simply attacks on democratic processes; they are also attacks on the experimental 
methods of the physical and social sciences.
It is important to be clear on this matter: pragmatist educational practice 
advances arm-in-arm with the methods of the sciences. Once we begin to assess 
religious beliefs and practices in terms of their functional roles within their cultural 
contexts, the implications tend to penetrate deeply into economic issues such as the 
feminization of poverty; public health issues, and issues that involve environmental 
sustainability. These are areas in which there are reliable, experimentally obtained 
data—data that allow us to transcend dogma and that provide the basis for intel-
ligent, informed classroom discussions of religious belief and practice.
It is also important to remind ourselves that just as is the case with biological 
evolution, older and newer institutional forms often exist side by side, even within 
religious communities that share the same name. Examples are plentiful: in terms of 
gender issues, public health, and economic development, the fundamentalist Islam 
of the tribal regions of Pakistan can only be regarded as atavistic when compared to 
the religious pluralism of more moderate (and more advanced) forms of Islam, such 
as those practiced by the Turkish Sufis. To take another example, in certain parts of 
Southeast Asia, despite the crystal clear message of the Buddha regarding idolatry, 
there are still religious people who claim to follow the teachings of Shakymuni but 
continue to live in a world populated by invisible spirits that must be placated, that 
constitute a drag on economic development, and that are the occasion for ethnic strife.11
The point that can be drawn from the discussion thus far, I hope, is the 
salutary effect of a pragmatist approach to educating about religion that stresses 
developmental trends in religious beliefs and institutions, all the while avoiding 
hard and fast taxonomies. My suggestions follow the trails blazed by John Dewey 
and William James. I am suggesting that we can teach our students that when reli-
gion is understood as a function of human life rather than as a set of ontological or 
ideological commitments, they will be more likely to understand their own beliefs 
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and practices, as well as those of their fellow global citizens half a world away, and 
consequently more capable of making informed decisions about their own religious 
commitments, or absence thereof.
I call this a pragmatist pedagogy because I am suggesting that we encour-
age our students to look at what a particular religious expression does—how it 
functions—in the realms of ethics, aesthetics, politics, and the technosciences, for 
example, and this from the perspective of a world that is shrinking day by day as 
its networks of communication become more extensive and complex. I am suggest-
ing that we encourage our students to consider how forms of religious expression 
function in their local environments, as well as within the broader context of the 
forces that are propelling globalization and in terms of those universalizable val-
ues that have been developed over time, such as those appearing in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.
Citizens of our world community will have many opportunities and, indeed, 
many incentives, to tailor their religious beliefs and institutions to their own needs 
and interests, rather than just automatically accept those of the communities into 
which they are born and nurtured. The results of the Pew surveys that I cited at 
the beginning of my presentation surely support this claim. I am convinced that 
the pragmatism of John Dewey and William James can help us develop a peda-
gogy to match the challenges of this situation, even though their accounts differ 
in important respects.
For William James, religious belief is in some sense universal. Religious 
belief is ultimately, in his view, a hedge against nihilism. But the particular form 
religious belief takes is for him ultimately a matter of cultural background and 
personal temperament.
The impulse to religious belief, he suggested, comes from what he termed the 
“more” that is beyond the limits of conscious experience, and most likely a func-
tion of the subconscious. He wrote that it involves “some part of the Self unmani-
fested; and always . . . some power of organic expression in abeyance or reserve.”12 
This “more” is a “subconscious continuation of our conscious life.”13 Then, in what 
can only be described as a deft move, he added that “invasions” from the subcon-
scious realm tend to take on objective appearances, and to give rise to feelings that 
something outside the organism, perhaps even some personality, is in control of 
the larger situation, if not destiny itself.
Why is this a deft move? Its force lies in the fact that James was at once lay-
ing the groundwork for two essential components of a pragmatist pedagogy of 
religious experience. First, he was raising the possibility of a naturalized religious 
experience that can be understood as a part of a common psychological inheri-
tance that is therefore of universal import above sect and creed. But second, and 
perhaps more important, he was also providing potential cover for the plethora of 
religious expressions that are attuned to differences in culture and temperament.
What We Can Teach When We Teach (About) Religion     11
Volume 32 (2) 2016
He accomplished this second move by introducing the concept of over beliefs. 
“Here,” he wrote, “the prophets of all the different religions come with their visions, 
voices, raptures, and other openings, supposed by each to authenticate his own 
peculiar faith.”14 So it is here that temperament and cultural background are fore-
grounded, generating vast arrays of belief systems and institutions that ride forth 
astride this universal psychological “more.”
Looked at from one end, we can see that James detected a sensibility com-
mon to all human beings that is rooted in the very nature of our common experi-
ences of the vague, the fringe, and our common sense of our own finitude in an 
infinitely complex and variable world. But this common sensibility takes on many 
forms of expression. Looked at from the other end, religious expressions, though 
richly variegated and complex, are rooted in experiences that are common to all 
humans, simply because of the ways in which we have evolved with and experience 
our environing conditions, including those that are social.
By making these moves, James’s implicit claim was that spirituality can be under-
stood in naturalistic terms, as a common feature of human life. But has he not thereby 
also opened the door to natural, which is to say, nonsupernatural religious belief? Has 
he not opened the door to religious expressions that are humanistic at their core and 
in their outlook? Has he not opened the door to the possibilities of religious belief on 
the part of those of our students who feel themselves excluded from that possibility? 
Has he not indicated how a bridge of understanding can be constructed between those 
of our students who are religious exclusivists, those whose primary commitment is to 
the relativism of deferral and difference, and even those who feel themselves excluded 
from religious belief because of their lack of institutional affiliation? 
In the postscript to The Varieties, James did in fact open the door to a type of 
religious experience that is at once naturalistic, humanistic, and pragmatist. “The 
practical needs and experiences of religion,” he wrote, “seem to me sufficiently met 
by the belief that beyond each man and in a fashion continuous with him there 
exists a larger power which is friendly to him and to his ideals. All that the facts 
require is that the power should be both other and larger than our conscious selves. 
Anything larger will do, if only it be large enough to trust for the next step.”15 
“Why,” he asked, “may not the world be a sort of republican banquet . . . 
where all the qualities of being respect one another’s personal sacredness, yet sit at 
the common table of space and time.”16 
But if James just barely opened the door to a humanistic religious outlook 
that is capable of serving as a common faith, then John Dewey eagerly flung the 
door open wide and stepped through it. His little book A Common Faith, for exam-
ple, might even be read as a reply to James. Dewey’s central argument was simple 
enough, and doubtless familiar to this audience. It is highly relevant to our current 
globalizing circumstances. He wanted to remind us that there is no such thing as 
religion in general. There is no single unique property that all religions share. Given 
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the plethora of possibilities, Dewey suggested, a person cannot choose religion in a 
generic sense; religion in the generic sense simply does not exist. To choose a reli-
gion is to choose a particular outlook on life, a particular set of ideals. Moreover, 
even if someone remains within the religious community into which he or she was 
born and nurtured, that nevertheless constitutes a choice.
Dewey’s solution to the problem of choosing from among the world’s many 
religions—or else coming to terms with the fact that none of them seem adequate 
to one’s needs—was to propose a common faith. He invited us to turn our attention 
from the noun religion to the adjective religious. He argued that religious qualities 
are capable of permeating many types of experiences, including those that are moral, 
aesthetic, and even political in nature. What he was after was naturalized forms of 
religious experience: religious outlooks that are comfortable with the advances of the 
technosciences, that do not attempt to compete with them regarding the control of 
facts, and therefore that render supernaturalism a personal rather than a public mat-
ter. Because every human being lives, at the very least, in a natural world, these would 
be forms of religious expression in which every human being could have a share.
“The aims and ideals that move us are generated through imagination,” Dewey 
wrote. “But they are not made out of imaginary stuff. They are made out of the hard 
stuff of the world of physical and social experience.”17 They involve “rearrange-
ments of existing things.” They involve a “process of creation that is experimental 
and continuous.”18 Dewey’s naturalism not only admitted, but celebrated human 
“spirituality.” When he and his colleagues published their collection of essays on 
philosophical naturalism in 1944, for example, they gave it the title Naturalism and 
the Human Spirit. What they were offering was a form of spirituality that felt very 
much at home with the technosciences and also with universalizable human values.
But Dewey’s common faith was not designed to be what the American Coun-
cil on Education warned against, namely, a “public school sect, which would take 
its place alongside existing faiths and compete with them.”19
So Horace Kallen may have gone a bit too far when he suggested that a demo-
cratic faith is “the religion of and for religions . . . [It is] the religion of religions.”20 
Recurring to the excellent work that Feinberg and Layton have done regard-
ing constitutional legitimacy and educational legitimacy, it is essential to recall that 
pragmatist pedagogy advocates for free and open inquiry and discussion, and not 
for or against any particular sect or religion. Dewey was not interested in undercut-
ting any particular religious faith. He was, however, interested in the possibility of 
recasting religious expressions in terms of their naturalistic context, and thereby 
providing a framework of belief for those who, because they have abandoned reli-
gious institutions, have concluded that religious values are thereby closed to them.
Now there might be those who would still object that Dewey was crossing the 
line of constitutional legitimacy when he raised the possibility that those of his stu-
dents who felt alienated from religious institutions might nevertheless have religious 
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experiences. But in a letter dated June 5, 1943, he provided a candid statement of 
his purpose in writing A Common Faith that undercuts objections of this type. He 
wrote to a U.S. army private named Charles E. Witzell, “I have taught many years 
and I don’t think that any of my students would say that I set out to undermine 
anyone’s faith . . . The lectures making up [A Common Faith] were meant for those 
whose religious beliefs had been abandoned, and who were given the impression 
that their abandonment left them without any religious beliefs whatever. I wanted 
to show them that religious values are not a monopoly of any one class or sect and 
are still open to them.”21 In other words, if there are religious qualities of many types 
of experiences, including our experiences of ideals and ends-in-view, then religious 
experience is available to everyone, regardless of a lack of institutional affiliation. 
But there is something more going on here. James and Dewey were both 
pragmatists, and one of the central ideas of pragmatism is that the meaning of a 
concept lies in its conceivable practical consequences. Another of its central ideas 
is that inquiry is at root experimental—that when it is successful it produces what 
James termed truth and what Dewey termed warranted assertibility. 
Dewey insisted that citizenship of any sort demands activities that involve 
relationships with others, and that citizenship therefore requires that choices be 
made between what is simply valued and what has proven by experimental means 
to be valuable. Many of those choices inevitably involve forms of religious faith and 
practice that have consequences for our fellow human beings. 
James and Dewey, in their different ways, recognized that a tendency to 
religious faith, broadly speaking, is virtually universal. Both opened the door 
to naturalized forms of religious expression that are comfortable with the advances 
of the technosciences. Both recognized the important roles of cultural context and 
temperament in the choice of religious belief and practice. But both sought to find 
ways that religious faith and practice, like every other area of life, could be informed, 
intelligent, and melioristic in its practice and outlook. Theirs was a pluralism of a 
critical variety, a celebration of the many and varied forms of religious expression 
coupled with a commitment to the type of rigorous inquiry that can provide the 
basis for choice when a choice must be made. 
But what of personal need for supernaturalistic religious faith? As I have indi-
cated, James attempted to solve this issue in terms of what he called over beliefs that 
depend on cultural background and temperament. In his view, we have the right 
to believe and act upon any hypothesis that is for us live, forced, and momentous. 
But as a pragmatist James also recognized that it is only by their fruits that reli-
gious beliefs can be evaluated.
Dewey’s answer to this question took a different turn. He was a philosophical 
naturalist, and thought that supernaturalism has effects that are often divisive and 
debilitating. He nevertheless recognized that the effects of supernaturalist beliefs 
are different for different people in different circumstances. In some circumstances, 
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supernaturalism can function as an excuse for avoiding intelligent thought and 
action. In other cases, supernaturalism functions as a means of seeing the world as 
healthy, whole, and conducive to the values of community. It is only by the fruits of 
religious belief—examining their place in processes of naturalistic inquiry—that 
they can be judged.
I hope and expect that teaching about religious experience in our schools, col-
leges, and universities will become easier as the world’s cultures learn more about 
one another. There are already models in music and food and popular culture for 
such cross-cultural experiences. It is probable that even many of the world’s exclu-
sivist religions will succumb to new opportunities for productive engagement with 
other religious institutions.22 As educators, we can play a major role in promoting 
and accelerating these developments.23 
In conclusion, let me recur to the three types of students whose needs have 
helped to structure this presentation. As we all know, teaching about religious 
experience, like teaching other subjects of importance, is about enlarging our stu-
dents’ options and choices.
To the student of an exclusivist persuasion, a pragmatist pedagogy of religion 
can open the door to a genuine sense of alternatives in the way of religious belief, 
and a sense of the effects that advances within the technosciences have had on the 
objects of religious dogma, especially in terms of the evolution of religious faith, 
practice, and institutions. 
To the student who has been persuaded by relativist claims of deferral and 
difference, a pragmatist pedagogy of religion can open the door to a genuine sense 
of the processes by which effective evaluations of competing religious orientations 
are possible in the light of the ideals, norms, and goals that are emerging as a part 
of the processes of cultural diversity and globalization.
To the student who believes that religious faith is no longer possible for him 
or her because affiliation with institutional religion is no longer possible, a prag-
matist pedagogy of religion can open the door to an understanding of the potential 
religious dimensions of all types of experiences, including those that are moral, 
political, and scientific.
To students of all three types, and to their teachers, I offer the suggestion that 
the versions of pragmatism advanced by William James and John Dewey offer rich 
resources for those of us whose task it is to consider “what we can teach when we 
teach (about) religion.”
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